



---

## International Journal of Social Science Archives

ISSN: 2707-8892

Available at [www.ijssa.com](http://www.ijssa.com)

International Journal of Social Science Archives, June, 2023, 6(1), 1- 9



---

## The Outlooks of India and China Interaction

Samina Khan<sup>\*a</sup>, Asad Malik<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Assistant Director Bahria University Islamabad.

<sup>b</sup>Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. Asadmalik2008@gmail.com

<sup>\*</sup>Email: [Saminakhan0666@gmail.com](mailto:Saminakhan0666@gmail.com)

---

**Abstract:** In this article, the perspectives of India and China's interaction are examined. Throughout the last fifteen years, the intricate character of India and China's ties has been clear: from promises of unending kinship to a border conflict. Throughout modern history, the dual character of ties between China and India has often amazed. India and China relations are a complicated web of interests, ranging from firm stances on border issues to recognition of Tibet as a part of China, from order to gain market share for energy assets to broadening corresponding trade, from the appearance of encompassing to increased participation in multilateral forums. The focus of the article is on the major issues surrounding the dispute over boundaries, territorial geopolitics, and financial ties. The triangle relationship between India, China, and US is beyond the scope of the article, despite the fact that it acknowledges the significant function performed by America in Asia and its impact on China-India ties.

**Keywords:** China, India, economics, geopolitics, and disputes.

---

### Introduction

Relations between China and India are not the only ones entangled in a complex web of security, dominance, interdependence, and beliefs. We can clearly see evidence of passion and competitiveness in China's relationship with Taiwan, which is bolstered by built-in notions of Chinese autonomy. Yet, one also cannot ignore the security situation on both sides, and at the same time, there is expanding monetary cooperation with its favorable effects. China's relationship with Japan, therefore, exhibits a synthesis of constructivist, liberalist, and pragmatic elements. Shades of aggressive and circumspect genuineness may be seen in the discouraged estimate of the America-Japan alliance and the ambiguity over Japan's involvement in a potential Taiwan emergency. Although Sino-driven perceptions of Asia and memories of embarrassment due to the Japanese fuel the rivalry, their expanding two-sided trade and ties in the Association of Southeast Asian States and the ASEAN Regional Forum have anticipated substantial impetus. This article's main points center on the economic difficulty, regional geopolitics, and boundary discussion, which, when sparked by false assumptions, ensure that ties between India and China would be hostile. Yet until 2020, expanding reciprocal commerce and the foundation for peaceful financial progress will preserve the

type and intensity of competition at a national level. India's Look East policy was sparked by China's connections to Pakistan and its actions in the Indian Ocean Area, which are seen as encirclement tactics. The growing energy needs of the two countries have enhanced this competition. In recent years, experts in India have argued that the potential linkages between China and India are more about cooperation and conflict than they are about disputes or participation. They acknowledge that the border problem is the most important one, but they also highlight the efforts being made to settle the argument and foresee the competition for resources. Realists understand that none of the nations is in a position to benefit from a local war.

## **Geopolitics**

The dispute sparked by Chinese hostility raises more significant concerns than the simple border separation. These inspiring statements from the Indian Prime Minister show that the aspects of Sino-Indian ties are more unexpected than what a simple dyad would anticipate. Nehru said in his analysis that the debate was a test of whether the Asian political system would prevail: democratic India or socialist revolutionary China [1]. Three specific geopolitical factors have an impact on Sino-Indian relations: measures to ensure the stability of the mountain ranges, the evolution of the foundation to project authority over the mountains, and movements around these geographical limits. China has maintained strong ties with Pakistan, courted the army regime in Myanmar, and increased its presence in the IOR in an effort to find routes around the mountain range and compel India into the South Asian framework. Examiners believe that India's key enclosure is prompted by China's String of Pearls technique [2]. As far as worries are concerned, India has lately started to look outside its immediate region; diplomatic notions like the Look East Policy, for instance, have an acknowledged part in careful adjustment to China. Yet, factors other than their mutual rivalries, such as financial issues and energy security, have an impact on China's and India's strategies. There are many hopes that mutual understanding of these aspects and affability towards one another's fundamental concerns would maintain the competition on a practical level. China has found a useful way to influence India without overt action via its relationships with Pakistan, and as a result, it is likely to continue supporting Pakistan. That is not the kind of pricey symbol that can reassure India of China's altruistic goal or resolve the security situation.

## **Pakistan and China Entente Cordiale**

The strongest elements of China's foreign policy, which has been depicted as multifaceted and troubled by tragedy, are its favorable ties with Pakistan. Pakistan and China are working together to weaken India on multiple fronts. It serves China's interests in Asia and serves as a defense mechanism against any Indian meddling in Tibet. For relations between China and Pakistan, a strong and stable Pakistan is crucial [3]. Moreover, the global network hyphenates Pakistan and India due to the war with India, placing China on a higher level. Several perspectives exist on the true link between the two independent governments, apart from the Indian factor. China is concerned about the US presence in the area and presents itself as a progressively reliable partner to Pakistan. Their respective commerce with Pakistan is estimated to be worth \$18 billion (2015). Pakistan is crucial for China in terms of the Muslim world and Xinjiang's security. Beijing also views Pakistan as a stepping stone to the IOR [4]. Whatever the case, India is still responsible for the development of this rather bizarre clash between an Islamic and a communist society. From the perspective of China, India may be becoming less troubled by Pakistan and more confident in itself versus China. In addition, giving up Pakistan would mean giving up South Asia as India's sphere of influence. India views the partnership between Pakistan and China as evil because it enables Pakistan to continue its plans to wage an intermediate war and deploy an atomic bomb quickly against India. India's long-term security is compromised by the ways in which China and Pakistan are linked, and questions about China's sincerity in wanting to improve ties with India are raised. China attempts to resolve this seeming contradiction by avoiding direct involvement in the military conflict between Pakistan and China and by taking an impartial stance on Kashmir, so addressing two of India's primary concerns. China has sought to maintain Pakistan's conventional and atomic power

in order to avoid having to make the difficult choice in the future confrontation between Pakistan and India of either joining the fight on Pakistan's behalf or allowing Pakistan an opportunity to be ultimately defeated. This tactic has been seen as a Chinese masterstroke in some aspects since it allows China to pressure India via a third party without putting itself at risk while also advancing efforts to strengthen ties and expand trade with India.

### **Gwadar Port**

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Gwadar port was improved and launched in 2007. China provided the majority of the \$1.16 billion project's funding, contributing an additional \$200 million to the construction of the 653-kilometer Marakan Coastal Highway that connects Gwadar and Karachi. The port will also be connected to the Karakoram Highway by a network of roads and trains. One of the largest and best-situated deep-sea ports on the planet, Gwadar has twelve docks and berths that can accommodate 200,000-ton ships as well as a sizable special financial zone [5]. China values Gwadar port strategically for a number of reasons. The initiative is first envisioned as a way to reduce India's ability to blockade Pakistan during combat. The port will also increase China's ability to supply Pakistan. Second, the port will help Pakistan become a hub for commerce and transportation between Central Asian nations and the rest of the globe. Third, the seaport will safeguard Chinese business dealings in the Persian Gulf. Fourth, it will provide a course on energy shunting to solve China's IOR shortcomings. Fifth, it will support the western area of China's financial development. Finally, the PLA Navy will also have another reason for using Gwadar as the gateway to the IOR if an army option arises. Take note of the port's almost 19-meter depth increase. Examiners draw attention to the fact that atomic submarines and transports benefit from a port that is almost 19 meters deep. A prime example of China's varied ties to Pakistan is the port of Gwadar. China has its own goals behind attempting to ensure stability in Pakistan, particularly as it pertains to American command in the region, even if adapting versus India is a notable element of the analyses. The Gwadar port is a piece of the infamous "String of Pearls" that represents China's ambitions in the IOR [6].

### **China and the Indian Ocean Region**

The objectives of China in the IOR may be seen in terms of its desire to exercise influence commensurate with its increasing strength, the security concern posed by its reliance on SLOCs, the threat posed by the continued presence of the US, and India's strategic location. Over 30% of China's marine commerce and 77% of its oil supplies flow via the IOR, which raises questions about safety and contributes to the Malacca dilemma. China is determined to develop long-term maritime capabilities to protect its critically important expanding interests, and the US navy force's capture of a Chinese ship in the Persian Gulf in 1993 on suspicion that it was transporting chemical weapons to Iran is seen as the catalyst for this determination. In essence, trade and economic development were considered China's key methods of upholding its legitimacy as well as meager ways to increase national wealth [7]. China is aware that the underlying causes of its power conflicts are Tibet and Taiwan. But, it worries that either America or India would exploit its reliance on SLOCs across the Indian Ocean [8]. With expanding Chinese activities acting as a geopolitical boundary, India sees the IOR as its actual zone of influence and opportunities. Zhao Nanqi, a member of the PRC General Staff, contends that we should never ever again refer to the Indian Ocean as solely the sea of Indians since China is suspicious of Indian accusations [9]. Garver calls this situation an "impossible security predicament" and makes it very evident that Chinese behavior is driven by security and financial concerns. In any case, he also acknowledges that China is becoming a powerful opponent of the IOR's status quo. India is forced to evaluate China's goals in the IOR in light of its efforts to construct impact centers, improve its energy lines, and strengthen its maritime strategy.

### **PLAN Diplomacy and Doctrine**

The PLAN's defensive tactics steadily shifted away from traditional coastal defense and towards offshore operational defense in 1985, emulating the Mahanian principles of force projection. The nation's maritime Great Wall, which is dependent on coastline defense and its two islands, was pushed to be built by Jiang Zemin in 1997. China, according to Xie (2014), is a superior maritime force. China was making progress in 1988 toward establishing a Blue Sea naval force. China devised a three-stage development plan to turn the strategy into a top-tier ocean control by 2040[10]. China hoped to have finished the second phase and acquired the tools necessary to deploy fleets into the Indian Ocean. Among the nine distinct destroyer classes that China has created since 1990 to expand its surface warfare force are the 051B-Luhai and 052C-Lanzhou vessels. China also employs coordinated air defense (AD) systems like the American Aegis radar and C-802 missile systems. PLAN is considering building a battleship that can transport aircraft; for R&D purposes, China purchased Melbourne from Australia and Minsk from South Korea. China has allegedly asked for the domestic production of two carriers. The J-10 multirole warrior airships, which will be bolstered by Il-78 aerial tankers, are anticipated to constitute the center of Chinese naval airpower. It is important to remember that China's maritime plans were mostly centered on the Taiwan situation and anticipated Pacific threats from the United States and Japan. Marine resources, however, are remarkably interchangeable, and as China's energy needs rose, the IOR gradually merged into its safety circle.

China is getting more excited about the IOR, as seen by the expansion of its maritime diplomacy in the area. In 1985, PLAN conducted the first marine expedition to the Indian Ocean from Chittagong, a close second, and Karachi, the main port. Mumbai participated in a similar endeavor in 1993, maybe to convince India of China's sincere intentions. Chinese policy often incorporates maritime diplomacy, including high-profile visits, coordinated maritime operations, and the provision of armaments to Indian Ocean coastal nations [6]. China expanded its influence on the French Western IOR by hosting the Africa-China summit in 2006[11]. In reality, because of a mismatch between its marine ambitions and capabilities, China's approach is likely to prove problematic.

## **East and India**

In 1991, India faced a number of political and financial challenges that put its survival in jeopardy. The conclusion of the Cold War created a gap that freed Southeast Asian nations like India from the grip of opposing forces in a bipolar global order. Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao developed a multidimensional East strategy after becoming conscious of the shifting geopolitics in order to establish a more substantial financial and political alliance with the vibrant Asian Pacific region [12]. This strategy was carried out via official connections with ASEAN and the development of bilateral ties with certain nations. As the primary drivers of this strategy, economics and the desire to develop India's North East must be emphasized. The ASEAN nations supported India as a possible counterweight to China's rising confidence, much to how the end of the Cold War impacted China's level of influence in the region and opened doors for India's financial liberalization. Being a participant in sect-based discourse in the fields of investment, business, technology, and tourism, India's admission into ASEAN (1992) depended on perceived leverage estimations [13]. Notwithstanding the fact that both ASEAN and India oppose authority, soft adaptation against China has been a cornerstone of their developing partnership.

## **Regional and Subnational Organizations**

India's connection with ASEAN was strengthening at a time when the region's nations were becoming more concerned about Chinese intentions in light of the Mischief Reef incident and the Spratly Islands issue. The absence of reaction from ASEAN to India's nuclear tests in 1998 is therefore cited by some commentators as proof of their ambition to act as the sole Asian force capable of later changing China [13]. In 1991, trade between ASEAN nations and India was \$3.5 billion; in 2016, it was \$39 billion [14]. Even if China and the ASEAN nations trade for \$160 billion, India has an advantage in the information technology industry. In addition, despite the lack of regional conflicts and contradictory historical occurrences, China has been treated favorably by the ASEAN nations. India

prepared to introduce Level 2 of its East Policy at the ASEAN-India Business Summit around the turn of the century. And some experts have seen the intention to construct an FTA (Free Trade Area) by 2016—two years after a similar commitment from China—as just another example of the Sino-Indian confrontation.

Notwithstanding China's reservations, India's participation in the East Asia Summit in 2005 was an important step in advancing relations between India and ASEAN. China skillfully utilized its clout to create two coalitions in the EAS: a center group restricted to the ASEAN (+3) and a later group that included every member of the periphery. In order to become an observer in the South Asian Organization for Regional Cooperation, China likewise used Pakistan's offices. India encouraged handing up the comparative advantage to the US and Japan, hurting the success of China's program in the process [4]. While it is said that the addition of New Zealand, India, and Australia to the EAS has given East Asian security a new lease of life, this must be seen from China's standpoint as an unwelcome diversion.

In an effort to challenge China's hegemony over these activities, India has pushed for participation via sub-local groups in addition to its relations with the ASEAN nations. The MGC (Mekong Ganga Cooperation), which was established by India in 2000 and concentrated on the tourist industry, education, and culture, was noticeably lacking China, a prominent Mekong state. Most people prefer India's proposals to China's identical plan when it comes to building a road and rail connection to Thailand [15]. Notwithstanding its relative institutional and financial limitations, India is still far from being able to convert a financial investment into strategic impact.

### **Exchange of Ideas**

With Singapore emerging as its most significant dual ally in the region, India's status in ASEAN has significantly improved. The bulk of their separate trade-related customs obligations has been decreased since the two countries inked an economic cooperation agreement in 2005. Singapore is the third-largest foreign investment specialist in India. Since 1994, India and Singapore have effectively worked together on military projects; in 2003, a defense cooperation agreement was signed, solidifying this connection even further. Singapore utilizes Indian military facilities in Babina, Deolali, Kochi, and Chandipur, while India has access rights and coordination privileges at Changi Naval Station [15]. Singapore is an example of a local country poised to attract India and avoid becoming too reliant on China while enjoying the comfort of America [16]. Vietnam was said to be India's most dependable partner by the defense minister at the time [17]. A solid foundation is created by shared fears about Chinese strength, memories of past hostility, and worries about expectations for the future. This cooperation is marked by the developing military and financial ties. 2003's forging of a meaningful alliance would certainly outweigh India's present political anxiety about delivering Brahmos and Prithvi missiles to Vietnam in compliance with the MTCR regulations. These actions in the China South Sea will strengthen Vietnam's army capabilities. Vietnam's reluctance to provide the Indian Navy landing rights at the Cam Ranh port, however, emphasizes the long-standing vacillation between respect and open hostility towards China [15]. Chinese investment in Vietnam increased from \$7.2 million to \$85.6 million as a result of a different response. It serves as an example of how nations in the area may seek significant flexibility by assisting rather than adapting, avoiding hegemony by any one large power. When it started the second stage of its East Policy, redefining the East, India was establishing connections with Japan. The worsening in relations between the PRC and Japan showed that Tokyo would be prepared to put aside its resentment over India's nuclear tests and be receptive to high-level official visits and military links.

### **India and China Economic Collaboration**

The process of monetary normalization of relations between the two countries is likely to contribute to the development of a world-class contract, formation theory, the main driver for personal banking players, expanded mutual business, and trade complementarities, along with some energy development. But, India's growing trade imbalance is not precisely the ideal distribution of labor, and concerns about Chinese interests in touchy sectors

might prevent true dependence. Trade between the two countries is definitely not the answer to improving ties between them. Yet, trade does allow China and India the ability to enjoy exceptional advantages and advance their relationship based on a new basis.

### **Institutional Mechanisms**

The Vajpayee visit (ex-prime minister of India) to China in 2003 sparked a desire for more significant financial cooperation between the two countries, and Wen Jiabao's trip to India in 2015 reinforced this commitment and further extended the financial connections. Two important agreements were signed during this most recent visit that laid out the political tenets for settling the border dispute and five-year plans for India and China's overall economic and financial cooperation [18]. A CEO meeting between India and China that aimed to connect the business networks attracted 130 corporate visionaries in 2006. Wen Jiabao's visit in 2005 also prepared the path for China to recognize Sikkim as a part of India, which led to the opening of commerce at Nathu La and the revival of the ancient Silk Road. Despite the fact that border commerce has often been considered to be of little consequence, the event was still filled with significance. To describe the exciting possible results of the cultural, historical, and financially advantageous connections between the two countries, Jairam Ramesh coined the term "Chindia." Dr. Manmohan Singh, the former Indian prime minister and modeler of India's monetary development, thought about the benefits of international commerce for China. At that point, it seems to be nothing out of the ordinary that the current Indian leadership appears supportive of maintaining what has begun in terms of deeper financial cooperation with China [5]. It is also possible to argue that political authorities from the two countries have pushed for financial cooperation in an effort to normalize bilateral relations since corporate reality seems to be pursuing the runaway. In this way, the administration of China and India's financial relations has become more uniform at three different levels: The China-India merged group on financial affiliations, science, and commerce at the policy level; and a merged working group supported by a set of the integrated board at the able to share secretary level. Private interests and corporate activity will continue to converge thanks to the business board's establishment. The provincial governments of Yunan, China, and West Bengal, India, for example, are exploring financial partnerships at the sub-state level and pushing their central governments for more significant cooperation. These developments have increased the number of fundamentally good pressures to continue with financial engagement for mutual benefit [19].

### **Mutual Trade**

The fact that many business visionaries have started to invest in one another's countries via partnership or private businesses is one encouraging sign of Indian and China commerce. Chinese companies like Haier and Huawei have created offices in India and Indian companies in the fields of IT training, programming agreements, banking, and medicines [20]. To meet Chinese demand, the Tata family developed a unique port and steel mill in Orissa, while the Reliance company used its political clout to hasten the granting of permits to Chinese officials hired for a gas pipeline project. Without political activity, such actions would not have been possible; recently, commercial actors have started to influence the tone of political alliances. Financial experts from several fields have looked at China's and India's comparative commercial advantages and the potential for future financial cooperation. China exports hardware and electrical equipment, whereas India's exports are dominated by necessary commodities such as metals, slag, iron, polymers, and steel [21]. New cooperative energies are being created by India's growth in services and China's quality of assembly. As a result, a Cisco or Motorola product may be labeled "Made in China," while the software is really "Made in India" [22].

According to some analysts, the two countries dependence on exports and foreign direct investment for economic growth would lead to competition between them. China received \$72 billion in FDI in 2006, compared to India's \$42 billion. According to the Indian Planning Commission, \$350 billion in investments are needed for the country's foundation, and FDI must rise to around 4% of GDP. Compared to India, which receives 10% of all FDI flowing to

China, China accounts for nearly half of that. While local financial structures may be to blame, the data suggests that the two countries' main sources of FDI are not the same. In terms of exports to third markets, the products where China and India have shown comparative advantages often fall into different categories with a 25% overlapping [23].

A few financial analysts blame China's currency devaluation and currency dumping practices as the root causes of this imbalance, although the causes are becoming more complex. First off, India and China's respective business shares reflect their respective business shares globally; in fact, India's exports to China have expanded more quickly than India's overall exports. Second, the trade is increasingly beneficial to China since India exports necessities while China exports high-value commodities. Finally, India's inability to compete in the industrial sector is a result of its outdated labor regulations, as well as administrative and structural flaws. Finally, customs fees in India are higher than in China. In this way, there is fear that the establishment of an FTA would just reinforce China's already strong position. Whatever explanation one leans towards, the result of these disparities is that certain Indian company anterooms aren't exactly fired up about doing business with China. A financial partnership also acknowledges that the transaction is equally important to the two partners. Despite being China's largest commercial partner, India does not appear in the top ten list of China's business partners. India's share of China's overall commerce with the country is still around 2%, despite China's share rising from 2% in 2000 to 9% in 2009.

In the current labor market, India and China are essential to trade partners due to a number of factors. India is strong in programming, whereas China has expertise in manufacturing; India exports necessities, while China offers made goods. Governmentally, the exchange of natural resources with China might not be possible in the long run. In 2007, Indian steel associations waged a campaign to limit the shipment of iron to China, which succeeded in persuading the Indian government to raise export levies, prompting China to lodge serious concerns. However, India's service-driven growth isn't extensive enough and doesn't allow for value expansion or the creation of jobs on par with the horticulture or manufacturing sectors. China, however, also makes an effort to develop its software sector. At some time, these elements can make the current complementarity less strong.

## Conclusion

By examining historical patterns in their respective affiliations since 1947, this research aims to analyze the prospects for India and China's interactions. Misperceptions will ensure that India and China's ties remain hostile due to regional disagreement, province geopolitics, and financial problem. Nonetheless, the high cost of conflict, growing financial cooperation, and the foundation for peaceful financial growth will also contribute to keeping the degree of competition at a reasonable level. The Look East Strategy of China and India's endeavors in the IOR are clear examples of the geopolitical issues in Asia's evident ineffective reaches. Similar perceived leverage tactics may be seen at work in the Pakistan-China nexus or in India's soft balancing. Nonetheless, it seems that China and India share the same security conundrum. With its influence over Tibet, the security of its SLOCs, and fears of agreement between America and India, China's defense intentions may be measured. India continues to be concerned about how China's authoritarian systems and the danger to its regional integrity. Thus, India perceives Tibet's framework upgrade and China's army modernization as hostile. The way in which China's rise as the "intermediate kingdom," its historical period of humiliation marked by military weakness and unstable settlements, and its impact on Tibet's identity and dignity. Moreover, China is particularly sensitive to India's territorial claims and what seems to be a threat to China's SLOCs since government authenticity rests on the distribution of financial liberty and the absence of political shifts.

## References

- [1] Garver. (2001). *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- [2] Khurana & Gurpreet. (2008). "China's 'String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications.'" *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 1.
- [3] Van Kemenade & Willem. (2008). *D'etente between China and India; The Delicate Balance of Geopolitics in Asia*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.
- [4] Scott & David. (2008). "The Great Power 'Great Game' between India and China: 'the Logic of Geography'." *Geopolitics* 13, no. 1.
- [5] Athwal,A (2008). *China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics*. First ed. New York: Routledge.
- [6] Khurana & Gurpreet. (2008). "China's 'String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications.'" *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 1.
- [7] Butt, K. M., & Siddiqui, S. J. (2021). Growing Chinese Presence in the Indian Ocean: Prospects and Challenges. *Strategic Studies*, 41(2), 64-81.
- [8] Holmes & Yoshihara. (2008). "China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3.
- [9] Scott & David. (2008). "The Great Power 'Great Game' between India and China: 'the Logic of Geography'." *Geopolitics* 13, no. 1.
- [10] Xie, Z. (2014). China's Rising Maritime Strategy: Implications for its Territorial Disputes. *Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies*, 3(2), 111-124.
- [11] McDonald, S. D., & Burgoyne, M. C. (Eds.). (2019). *China's Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations* (p. 0307). Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
- [12] Naidu. (2004). "Whither the Look East Policy: India and Southeast Asia," *Strategic Analysis* 28, no. 2. Pathak, Vidhan (2009: 79). "China and Francophone Western Indian Ocean Region: Implications for Indian Interests." *Journal of Defence Studies* 3, no. 4.
- [13] Rehman & Iskander. (2009). "Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's Counter-Containment of China in Asia." *Asian Security* 5, no. 2.
- [14] Sengupta, Ashok, Trade and Investment Relations of India & ASEAN Countries: Opportunities & Challenges (January 19, 2021). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3768965> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3768965>
- [15] Brewster, and David. (2009). "India's Strategic Partnership with Vietnam: The Search for a Diamond on the South China Sea?" *Asian Security* 5, no. 1.



- [16] Batabyal. (2006). "Balancing China in Asia, A Realist Assessment of India's Look East Strategy." *China Report* 42, no. 2. Pp: 179.
- [17] Kamath, P. M. (Ed.). (2013). *Nuclear disarmament: Regional perspectives on progress*. Emerald Group Publishing.
- [18] Hsu Kuei-hsing. (2005). *The Impact of Opening Up Sikkim's Nathu-La on China-India Eastern Border Trade*. Taiwan: National Chengchi University.
- [19] Holslag & Jonathan. (2010). *China and India, Prospects for Peace*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- [20] Sekhar. (2005). "Science and Technology Cooperation between India and China." *International Studies* 42, no. 3.
- [21] Virmani & Arvind. (2006). "India-China Economic Cooperation." In *China and India: Learning from each Other Reforms and Policies for Sustained Growth*, edited by Jahangir Aziz, Steven Dunaway and Eswar Prasad. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- [22] Van Kemenade & Willem. (2008). *D'etente between China and India; The Delicate Balance of Geopolitics in Asia*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.
- [23] Taube, M., & Ögütçü, M. (2002). Main issues on foreign investment in China's regional development: prospects and policy challenges. *Foreign Direct Investment in China*, 17.